Istraživanje pojave afričke kuge svinja na velikoj komercijalnoj farmi svinja u Srbiji by Nešković, Milijana et al.
219




*Corresponding author: e-mail: vlade@niv.ns.ac.rs
AFRICAN SWINE FEVER OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION
ON LARGE COMMERCIAL PIG FARM IN SERBIA
Milijana NEŠKOVIĆ1, Bojan RISTIĆ1, Rade DOŠENOVIĆ1, Siniša GRUBAČ2, 
Tamaš PETROVIĆ2, Jasna PRODANOV-RADULOVIĆ2, Vladimir POLAČEK2*
1Veterinary Institute Zaječar, Zaječar, Serbia; 2Scientifi c Veterinary Institute “Novi Sad”, Novi Sad, 
Serbia
(Received 17 May, Accepted 31 May 2021)
The fi rst confi rmed case of  African Swine Fever (ASF) in Serbia occurred in 2019. 
Since then, numerous outbreaks in domestic pigs and wild boars have been reported. 
Until April 2021, all the detected ASF cases were in backyard pigs. Beside backyard 
and smallholders farming systems as a dominant pig production system in Serbia, large 
commercial pig farms can also be found, located mostly in villages. In the beginning of  
April 2021, a large commercial farrow-to-fi nish pig farm in Serbia with almost 19,000 
animals was affected with the ASF virus. The pig farm analysed in this paper is located in 
an area where ASF was confi rmed earlier in both backyard and wild boars. In this study, 
we describe the overall epidemiological course of  the ASF outbreak. Epidemiological 
investigation using a hypothesis-based approach was conducted in order to reconstruct 
the disease course until the offi cial notifi cation. All the available data from the farm 
were analysed with the aim to determine the high-risk period (HRP). Some of  the key 
points to consider when it comes to the sources of  infection and entry route of  ASF 
are the following: contamination of  the area in the immediate vicinity of  the farm, risky 
human activities, irregularities and some omissions in the external farm biosecurity and 
immediate proximity of  the city waste-yard where the communal waste is disposed of. 
It was concluded that when commercial pig farms are surrounded by villages with a 
large number of  backyards, hence the anthropogenic factor is the key risk factor for 
ASF spreading.  
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INTRODUCTION
The fi rst case of  ASF in Serbia was recorded in July, 2019 in the village Rabrovac, 
Mladenovac municipality in domestic backyard pigs [1]. Although the Veterinary 
Directorate of  the Republic of  Serbia issued a set of  control and preventive measures 
to be implemented in the country and at the borders with Romania and Bulgaria as 
high risk areas in 2017, the fi rst case was detected in the central region of  Serbia. 
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Since the fi rst outbreak, this disease has been (sporadically) recorded in the population 
of  domestic pigs, predominantly in backyard pigs and in the wild boar population. 
Contrary to this, in most of  the European countries, the epidemic is present in wild 
boars, but domestic pigs are not primarily affected [2,3]. However, in the region of  
South-East Europe strong association of  ASF with the domestic pig population on 
small holdings, where the animals are kept at low-biosecurity like backyards and even 
under free-range management was noted [4,5]. In the domestic pig production cycle, 
and in certain aspects of  the wild boar-habitat cycle, the driver of  ASF transmission 
is human activity [3,6]. ASF transmission risks in the domestic pig production cycle 
are the highest when pig production is dominated by small holdings or backyards, 
with low levels of  biosecurity [5,7]. Likewise, the risk contact and probability for 
disease transmission between domestic pigs and wild boars are higher in such systems 
compared to industrialised (commercial) pig farming systems [8,9]. Despite higher 
biosecurity measures, the presence of  the ASF virus in backyard pig populations is a 
constant threat to domestic industrial pig production [9,10]. Backyards are a common 
practice in villages in Serbia and quite a high percentage of  pigs are bred in this way. 
Besides backyards, a large number of  small holdings i.e.  family type pig farms can 
be found. Biosecurity measures are not offi cially required by veterinary regulations; 
they are only given as a recommendation to the farmers [10]. Consequently, it is quite 
diffi cult to protect the domestic pigs from ASF when large commercial farms are 
surrounded by a number of  smallholdings and backyards [11-13]. 
In this study, we present the results of  an epidemiological investigation conducted in 
one large commercial farrow-to-fi nish pig farm, affected by ASF. In the beginning of  
2021, a larger number of  ASF cases were registered in wild boars and in backyards 
that were in the proximity of  this farm, in the East of  Serbia. Generally, the backyard 




The investigated commercial pig farm is located in the East of  Serbia, only 4 km away 
from the Bulgarian border. From the production point od view, it represents a large 
farrow-to-fi nish farm with almost 19,000 pigs, including around 900 sows and all other 
categories (sucklings, weaned pigs, fatteners, gilts and boars) on one-site. The main 
production characteristics are similar to most commercial pig farms in Serbia: piglets 
are weaned at the age of  28-35 days, and they are transferred to a weaning and later 
growing unit. Finishing pigs are slaughtered at the weight of  approximately 110 kg or 
when they are about 25 weeks old [10]. Based on the production stage, all animals are 
kept in separate barns with a common yard.
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Epidemiological investigation 
Epidemiological investigation included on-site inspections, interviews with relevant 
staff  from the farm’s management, veterinarians and workers directly involved in 
daily care of  the farm animals [11]. The outbreak investigation was performed by 
a local epidemiologist and veterinary authorities, as required by Serbian legislation. 
The main points to check were the farm organizational structure and location, and all 
points related to external biosecurity: entrance of  all transportation vehicles, employee 
structure, the record of  persons who have recently entered farm premises, animal 
movements from the beginning of  2021 and feed purchase.  Also, the percentage of  
mortality in all production categories (analyzed separately) in the last three months, 
timeline of  the detected disease, as well as clinical and postmortem fi ndings were 
analyzed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Chronology of events 
There were cases of  dead sows (animals previously excluded from the further 
production cycle), between 25th and 31st March, 2021. During this period, a total 7 
sows died, fi ve of  which were from facility No. 1 (the barn for gestating sows), the 
facility which is the closest to the city waste-yard. Following this, in accordance with 
the farm production strategy, a few sows were transferred from facility No. 1: on 5th 
April 2021 sows were relocated to the farrowing stable No. 3/2- and on the next day, 
6th April, two more pregnant sows were transferred to another barn for gestating sows 
Figure 1. Geospatial farm setup
Legend: No.1, 9 – gestating stable; No. 3/2, 7/2, 11/2 – farrowing room; No.5 – insemination 
stable; No. 3/1, 7/1, 11/1 – weaning stable; No. 2,4,6,8,10,12 – fattening stable
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(No. 9). After this, in the period between 1st and 6th April 2021, another 2 sows from 
the same facility No. 1 died (on the 1st and 5th April). 
The offi cial documents issued on 7th and 8th April showed that there were additional 
two cases of  sow deaths and one abortion in facility No. 1 on 7th April, while the report 
from 8th April marks the deaths of  two sows from the facility No. 1 and No. 7 and 
two abortions from facility No. 1. The alarming number of  deaths in the category of  
gestating sows and abortions on the commercial farm was reported to the veterinary 
authority on 9th April 2021, when a total 11 sows died: 7 sows from facility No. 1, 
one sow from facility No. 9 and three sows from the farrowing stable (No. 3/2). The 
fi rst abortion was detected on 7th April, following another two abortions on 8th April. 
Considering the heath issues of  sows, the control showed that there were no written 
records on pig abortions before 7th April 2021. 
Clinical and gross pathological fi ndings
About 15 sows in the facility No. 1 (gestating sows) and 3/2 (farrowing stable) had the 
following clinical symptoms: high fever (ranging between 41 oC and 42 oC), general 
weakness, loss of  appetite and anorexia, severe depression, rapid breathing. Further, 
the  animals showed  discoloration (redness) of  the skin, especially on the region of  
the chest and abdomen, perineum, distinct cyanotic spots and skin colour changes 
on the ears, even haemorrhages of  the skin. Also, increased foam discharge from 
the mouth and nostrils, and conjunctivitis with ocular discharge were notifi ed. Two 
pigs also had extensive yellow foaming saliva and they were vomiting. Clinically, mass 
abortions in all pregnant sows, regardless of  gestation stage were detected. In the 
other production units (sucklers, weaners, fattening pigs, gilts, boars) no clinical signs 
of  acute infective disease were notifi ed.
After the urgent necropsy and gross pathological examination, the following changes 
on the organs and tissues were determined in dead pigs from facility 1 and facility 
3/2: splenomegaly (the spleen was enlarged, connective tissue in the spleen was too 
tight, which makes the spleen feeble and it breaks very easily; the pulp is softened and 
squashy); the lymph nodes (epigastric, mesenterial, portal lymph nodes) were very 
enlarged, dark red and bloody on cross section. The serosa and mucosa of  small 
and large intestines were extremely hyperemic. After removal of  the renal capsule, 
rare petechial haemorrhages were detected on the kidneys. There were also petechial, 
spotty bleedings on the pericardium. The clinical picture and gross pathology changes 
in diseased/dead sows correspond to the acute course of  ASF described by other 
authors [14,15].
Immediately after the report on a large number of  dead sows and massive abortions 
on the farm, the blood swab samples and swabs of  organ (spleen) were taken from 
the facilities No.  1 and 3/2. At the same day, by laboratory examination (molecular 
diagnostics, real time PCR) the positive result on the presence of  ASF virus genome 
was confi rmed at the National Referent Laboratory for ASF in Serbia. In total nine 
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out of  twelve samples were ASF positive. Following disease confi rmation, all control 
measures according to Serbian law were ordered (animal movement restrictions, 
stamping out of  all farm animals, safe disposal). 
Estimation of the high-risk period 
It is very important to detect infected farms as early as possible after ASF virus entry 
in order to reduce the further spread of  the disease and to minimize the losses in the 
pig sector and costs associated with outbreak eradication [12]. Control of  farm records 
disclosed that the mortality rates by production categories were not higher than the 
technologically accepted normative for this type of  commercial pig production in 
Serbia. The date that was noted as the fi rst clinical sign of  acute infective disease, 
i.e., the fi rst clinical manifestation was the abortion, i.e., index case was 7th April. The 
deaths of  sows and abortions are typical for ASF on pig farms and it can be considered 
as a direct clinical manifestation of  ASF [14,15]. High Risk Period (HRP) is the likely 
length of  time that ASF has been present on the farm before notifi cation [11].
a. HRP “Scenario A”
The date when this disease was fi rst reported on the farm was 9th April (the date when 
the investigation was conducted). Clinical picture of  the acute course of  the disease in 
sows whose abortion was recorded on 7th April, 2021 started on 6th April, 2021 (when 
abortion theoretically began). If  we take into account the fact that the shortest period 
of  ASF incubation is 4 days and the longest is 19 days, then the date when the virus 
most likely entered the farm was 18th -19th March (19 days of  incubation), while the 
latest date when the virus entered the farm could be 2nd-3rd April (four-day incubation). 
Therefore, we can consider that HRP is from 7 to 21 days (Figure 2). 
b. HRP “Scenario B”
The farm records show that there was an increased number of  sow deaths in the 
period from the 25th  to 31th of  March.  with a total of  7 dead sows, fi ve of  which were 
from the facility No. 1.  It is also stated that the sows that died had a different etiology 
           Figure 2. Time line with HRP estimation for ”Scenario A”
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before death: two sows died due to leg injury, one due to pneumonia, another one due 
to stomach ulcer, while the cause of  death of  one of  the sows was uterine torsion and 
one had a potential heart condition. These death cases were not sent to laboratory 
examination for the ASF virus. In this period, the ASF virus was probably already in 
the facility No. 1, so it is very likely that the fi rst record of  sow deaths in this period 
was related to ASF virus. If  the deaths of  sows between 25th and 31st March 2021 are 
potentially directly related to ASF entry, then it means that the virus had entered the 
farm between 5th and 6th March at the earliest (19-day incubation) or between 20th and 
21st March (4-day incubation period). In this case, HPR period can be estimated to 
range from 19 to 34 days (Figure 3).
Potential  ASF spreading scenario
Additional laboratory testing of  the swab samples (RT-PCR) conducted on 12th April 
2021 showed a positive result to ASF in only one sample of  a diseased gestating sow 
(barn No.  9), while all the other samples from other production phases (weaning 
and fi nishing barn) taken on the same day were negative (1 out of  178 samples). This 
shows that the virus was spreading slowly on the farm, affecting only the sows.  This 
has also been confi rmed by some other researchers so far [5,11,14]. The sick sow 
was transferred from stable No. 1  to stable No.  9 and  No. 3/2 on 5th and 6th April. 
This is another piece of  evidence to confi rm our presumption that the disease fi rst 
appeared in stable No. 1 and then it spread to the farrowing barn (No. 3/2) and to the 
gestation room (stable No. 9). Regardless of  disease speeding, early ASF diagnosis and 
implementation of  control measures necessary to control and eradicate the disease are 
imperative [16].
External biosecurity farm control
The investigated commercial farm is located in the East of  Serbia, only 4 km away 
from the Bulgarian border, which is another risk factor, having in mind that the 
current unfavourable epidemiological ASF situation in the neighbouring Bulgaria 
[4,17]. Indeed, during the 2018-2020 period, ASF virus was diagnosed in neighbouring 
countries Romania and Bulgaria in both domestic pigs and wild boars [8,16]. Romania 
          Figure 3. Time line with HRP estimation for ”Scenario B”
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was particularly affected by the ASF virus, with more than 1,000 outbreaks reported 
during the second half  of  2018 and the situation is still not under control [4,13]. 
Considering the external biosecurity measures, all farm facilities are fenced with 
double fence. There is a disinfection barrier on the farm entrance for all transportation 
vehicles and automatic sprayer with nozzles. According to the research of  Bellini et 
al. [18] and De Lorenzi [19], high levels of  farm biosecurity including paying special 
attention to the disinfection process is considered as the most important tool for 
preventing ASF virus entering pig farms. 
The production system requires the vehicles to come very close to the production area 
in order to transfer feed to the bin, after they have performed the disinfection process. 
This is a major biosecurity issue for most of  commercial pig farms in Serbia. However, 
another problem is the farm production technology which is organized in such way 
that gilts are brought from two different locations every 6-7 weeks, from the North 
of  the country (ASF free region). Animals are quarantined for 6 weeks on the farm 
and are physically separated from other production units. The last delivery of  gilts was 
from ASF free region (the North of  the country) in mid-February. 
Regarding the assessment of  external biosecurity, it is important to point out that the 
commercial farm is located on a very unfavorable location: in the vicinity of  the city 
waste yard (about 200 m from the farm facility (facility marked No.1). The waste yard 
has a large population of  rodents, and they can easily migrate to the pig facilities. The 
city waste yard is also a place where the owners of  backyards pigs may dispose of  
potentially infected  biological material after home slaughtering and/or the carcasses 
of  dead animals. 
It is also signifi cant to emphasize that this commercial farm is in the immediate vicinity 
of  a village (about 6 km away), where ASF was confi rmed in the backyards in March 
2021. During 2020 and 2021, ASF was detected in wild boars in the hunting areas in this 
district. It is especially important that a certain number of  employees on the farm live 
in the village where ASF was diagnosed. The farm has taken appropriate biosecurity 
measures regarding employee control: the employment contract prohibits employees 
from keeping backyard pigs and from having contacts with other domestic pigs in 
the village after working hours. However, indirect (mechanical) ASF transmission of  
virus is realistic and possible to happen by people (there is a chance that clean and 
potentially dirty routes that people use can intersect) [11]. Another potential way to 
transmit the virus is through frequent feed unloading, where vehicles can contract the 
ASF virus when passing through the infected area near the farm [18].
Considering biosecurity measures targeted to humans, employees are banned from 
bringing any food to the farm. The staff  working on the farm is provided meals 
by the farm (at a staff  canteen). It is mandatory for farm workers to perform hand 
disinfection and take a shower before entering the farm. They also have to change 
clothes, shoes and put on their uniforms that are kept on the farm. Before entering 
pig barns, they change their shoes again and go through disinfection barriers placed 
on the entrance of  each unit. From the organizational point, workers in fattening units 
do not perform any other activities in other facilities, but they all use the same toilets 
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and canteen. However, the workers from maintenance department (e.g., electricians, 
repairmen, etc.) are allowed to enter all the facilities on the farm. However, it is 
essential to point out that a couple of  employees on the industrial farm live in the 
village where the cases of  ASF had been recorded. Pig farming in this region of  
Serbia has a number of  traditional and cultural characteristics like pig slaughtering in 
backyards, natural mating, swill feeding, etc. These activities are highly risky in terms 
of  disease transmission [3,8], but unfortunately are frequently underestimated by local 
farmers, the backyard owners.




Probability of  
Introduction 
Pathway
Link to infected wild 
boar
Set up of  the farm
All animal facilities are located inside 
the farm perimeter. The farm area 
is enclosed by a double fence, with 
a buffer zone between. There is no 
direct contact with wild boars.
Negligible
Indirect contact 
with wild boar 
environment
The ASF in wild boar population was 
confi rmed last year. Moderate
Anthropogenic 
factor
Workers are banned from breeding 
backyards. Contacts with domestic 






Feeding regime Pigs are fed with complete feed, which originates from ASF free area. Negligible
Anthropogenic 
factor
Farm workers are banned from 
bringing food to the farm. Negligible
Trade/animal 
movement
Introduction of  
infected animals
The last gilts delivery was from ASF 
free area at the beginning of  the year. Low




Close to the farm
Farm is in the vicinity of  a city waste-
yard. The waste from the whole 
region is disposed of  at this waste-
yard. 
High
Distant from the 
farm
It is close to the village where ASF 
was confi rmed in domestic pigs. High
Transport vehicles
Feed transport Vehicles come close to the fence in order to unload feed. High
Transport of  
fatteners
Vehicles come close to the facility in 
order to load fatteners. High
Rendering plant Vehicles come relatively close to carcass containers. Moderate
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CONCLUSION
Although the appropriate farm authorities have urgently undertaken all well-known 
external biosecurity measures, they were not able to prevent numerous high- risk 
human activities in the surrounded infected area (indirect contacts with infected 
backyards, wild boars). Our investigation showed that anthropogenic activities have 
most likely contributed to ASF virus entering the commercial pig farm,  together with 
the proximity to the backyards with ASF infected pigs and contaminated surrounding 
area. 
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ISTRAŽIVANJE POJAVE AFRIČKE KUGE SVINJA NA VELIKOJ 
KOMERCIJALNOJ FARMI SVINJA U SRBIJI
Milijana NEŠKOVIĆ, Bojan RISTIĆ, Rade DOŠENOVIĆ, Siniša GRUBAČ, Tamaš 
PETROVIĆ, Jasna PRODANOV-RADULOVIĆ, Vladimir POLAČEK
Prvi slučaj afričke kuge svinja (AKS) u Srbiji je dijagnostikovan 2019. godine. Od tada, 
beleži se pojava bolesti u populaciji domać ih i divljih svinja. Sve do aprila 2021. godine 
žarišta AKS su bila lokalizovana u populaciji domaćih svinja u seoskim dvorištima. 
Pored seoskih gazdinstava i porodičnih farmi kao dominantnog načina proizvodnje, 
u Srbiji se nalaze i velike komercijalne farme svinja, uglavnom oko seoskih naselja. 
Početkom aprila 2021. godine, u komercijalnoj farma svinja, proizvodnog kapaciteta 
oko 19000 jedinki, potvrdjena je infekcija virusom AKS. U radu je sa epizootiološkog 
aspekta, hronološki opisan tok infekcije AKS. Epizootiološko istraživanje je zasnova-
no na hipotezama u cilju utvrdjivanja potencijalnih puteva unošenja AKS. Analizirani 
su dostupni farmski podaci kako bi se utvrdio vremenski period visokog rizika (HRP). 
Farma svinja se nalazi u području gde je u prethodnom periodu potvrđena AKS u se-
oskim gazdinstvima, kao i u populaciji divljih svinja. Kontaminacija ambijenta u nepo-
srednoj blizini farme, visoko rizične aktivnosti humane populacije u okruženju (brojna 
seoska gazdinstva), postojanje pojedinih aktivnosti visokog rizika u realizaciji eksterne 
biosigurnosti i neposredna blizina gradske deponije gde se odlaže komunalni otpad, 
su svakako ključni momenti kada se razmatraju izvori infekcije i put unošenja AKS. 
Zaključeno je da u uslovima kada su komercijalne farme okružene selima, u kojima su 
dominira uzgoj domaćih svinja u seoskim dvorištima, ljudske aktivnosti predstavljaju 
ključni faktor rizika za širenje AKS.
